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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION
Organizations and their actions have a large and continuing impact
upon the world of men. Indeed, it is hard to visualize a world in which
there would "be no organized human endeavor. Unfortunately, society's un
derstanding of organizational behavior has yet to equal organizational
import. Man has tried to understand this behavior, but his success has
been limited and fragmented. However, an important turning point toward
a more comprehensive understanding of organizational behavior has been
reached in Organizations in Action by James D. Thompson. His work, based
on the open-system school of organizational thought, perceives an organ1

ization as survival-oriented and interdependent with its environment.

Therefore, organizations are grounded in uncertainty and it is difficult
to predict their reactions. Thompson's postulations develop this concept.
He "enables us to conceive of the organization as an open system, indeter
minate and faced with uncertainty, but subject to criteria of rationality
and hence needing certainty."

2

If an organization is thought to be

rational and to have a need for certainty, Thompson can offer propositions
as to how and when an organization will act. The effect of Thompson's
work is best summarized by S. H. Udy. "The effort meets with mixed
-|
This paper does not discuss the open-system vs. closed-system
controversy. However, if the reader wishes to familiarize himself with
this topic see Thompson's Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1967)1 PP» 4-7*
^Ibid., p. 1 3 .
1
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success,...

But such problems hardly mar the achievement of this book

in synthesizing a variety of theoretical viewpoints and indicating a num
ber of new directions to follow.

It could be something of a

landmark."3

Purpose and Scope
It is the purpose of this paper to assess the validity and utility
of several of Thompson's propositions by determining whether two very dif
ferent organizations—the National Farmers* Organization and an Array Divi
sion—can be described by them.

The author does not have conqslete know

ledge of the functions of all parts of these two organizations. Therefore,
this study is limited to the author's personal observations of two specific
organizational parts; namely, the Field Staff of the National Farmers* Or
ganization and the G-1 Office of an Amy Division,

The author has thorough

knowledge of each through his" experiences as a G-1 Manpower and G-1 Readi
ness Officer for a two-year period, during his three and one-half years in
the U.S. Amy; and as Field Staff representative for the NFO during a threemonth sunmer Job,

If these organizational segments uphold Thon5)son*s propo

sitions, it is logical to spectilate that, in their entirety, both organiza
tions will also support them.

There will, no doubt, be differences in the de

grees to which other parts of these two organizations uphold them because of
variations in function, structure, and objectives.

The value in assessing

ThoiT5>son*s propositions—if they do represent reality—is to give the
science of organizational management an la^sortant tool with which to un
derstand, Interpret, and predict an organization*s actions easily and
acc\irately.

This paper seeks to establish the validity and utility of

3s, H. Udy, "American Sociology Review," in Book Review Digest. 1968.
ed. by Josephine Somudio (New York: The W. H. Wilson Company, 1969), p. 1320,
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certain of Thompson's propositions in oirder to provide part of an assess
ment of this tool for the analysis of organizational behavior.
Because of the large number of propositions that Thonqjson has
formulated, it is unrealistic to attenpt to analyse all of them con^jletely
here.

Therefore, I decided to analyze only the first five of Thompson's

propositions.

The ii^ortant point of this paper is not to determine how

many propositions can be analyzed but to ascertain what information is
derived from those that are explored. From this examination it should
be possible to extrapolate the validity and utility of the remainder of
Thoinpson's propositions.
This paper is conqjosed of three parts. Part One includes the
introduction and pvtrpose of the paper, and provides an outline of the or
ganizations to be analyzed, in three chapters. Part Two is the main body
of the papfr in which Thon5)son*s work is an analysis of the two abovementioned organizational sections. It is necessary to discuss Thon^son's
first proposition for a conqjlete chapter in Part Two in order to clarify
his con5)licated terminology and to set the stage for the ensuing proposi
tions,

Once this is acconqjlished, the remaining four propositions will

be covered in a much more abbreviated manner within a single chapter. In
effect, once one proposition is clearly understood, it then acts as the
key to an understanding of the others. Part Three includes the conclu
sions drawn from the analysis in Part Two and a selected bibliography.
This discussion does not include specific recommendations for the two ana
lyzed sections of the organizations; it rather involves a discussion of
Thon^json's propositions on organizational theory and their inqilications
for the two organizations.

CHAPTER I

THOMPSON; A BASIS FOR ANALYSIS
Ra-fcionali-by

A condition which Thompson places upon all of his propositions
is found in the phrase, "Under norms of rationality."^ By listing the
five propositions to be covered by this study, it is possible to clarify
this all-important condition. These first five propositions are; (1.)
Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to seal off their core
technologies from environmental influences; (2.) Under norms of rationality,
organizations seek to buffer environmental influences by surrounding their
technical cores with input and output components; (3.) Under norms of ra
tionality, organizations seek to smooth out input and output transactions;
(4.) Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to anticipate and

adapt to environmental changes which cannot be buffered or leveled; ( 5 . )
When buffering, leveling, and forecasting do not protect their technical
cores from environmental fluctuations, organizations under norms of rationality resort to rationing.

A norm is a standard of some society.

Thus, an organizational action can be judged on the criterion of ration
ality only as its society views it. The society of which the organization
^Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 19.

^Ibid., Chapter 2, pp. 19-23.

4
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is a part judges its actions; it makes the distinction between the ac
cepted and the unaccepted.

Needless to say, various societies will not

always rule identically upon the rationality of an organization's actions—
what is rational in one society may be illogical in another,

Thompson's

propositions probably depict the actions of American organizations ac
curately as that is his society.

Were he attempting to describe the ac

tions of organizations from a different society, the likelihood of his
being in error would increase significantly.
Now what exactly does this phrase "norms of rationality" mean in
the context of his propositions?

An organization operates within an en

vironment which poses many uncertainties, but there is a need for certainty
if an organization is going to achieve goals and suirvive.

Therefore, an

organization imposes standards of rationality on its actions to reduce
this TMicertainty,

The part of Thompson's propositions following the

phrase, "Under norms of rationality," describes an action that an organi
zation' will follow with the approval of its society while it strives logi
cally to find certainty within its environment.

There will be times, no

doubt, when the imcertainty of the environment may overwhelm an organiza
tion, ca\ising it to act in an illogical manner.

Under such conditions, an

organization may not follow Thompson's propositions.

Most of the time,

however, if uncertainties are not too great, an organization will seek
certainty by following actions which correspond to its society's standards
of rationality.

6
Value of Comparison
Many of the works on organizational theory are based upon the
study of one or several similar organizations. The resultant weakness is
hest described by Amitai Etzioni. "Many case studies of organizations
close with some universal statement about organizational variables 'based'
on the study of one organization.

Thus the lack of comparative models

leads not only to overgeneralization but also to undergeneralization."^
This paper will attempt to avoid this weakness by analyzing two very dis
similar organizations in order to discern the existence or non-existence
of the common characteristics suggested by Thompson, The characteristics
of these organizations differ decidedly in that one, the G-l Office of an
Army Division, is hi^ly structured, fairly old, and assured of its con
tinued existence; the other, the Field Staff of the National Farmers' Or
ganization, is less structured, fairly young, and less certain of its own
(or of the larger organization's) continued existence in a hostile environ
ment. If both of these organizations react in the same way, in various
situations, we can then draw some conclusions as to the nature of all or
ganizational behavior, (it should be noted, however, that even if two
organizations react in the same way, this does not conclusively prove—
but does support—the proposition in question.) Caution should be used;
even if a proposition has been upheld by the investigation of a number of
organizations, there is no assurance that it will apply to another
^Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations
(New York; The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., A Division of the CrowellCollier Publishing Company, I96I), p. xiii.
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organization. A real danger exists in that one might force an organiza
tion to conform to a model| rather than huild a model to conform to an
empirical reality. It is best to keep organizational theory general and
flexible, using specifics from a single organization only as illustra
tions of the theory.

CHAPTER II

EXPOSITION OP THE G-1 OFFICE
The Chain of Command of a Division
A division is the higgest coralDat unit of the Army. It is a com
pletely independent organization and can function on its own for an in
definite period of time. The strength of any army is measured by the
combat ability of its divisions and their number. Thus, the division is
the functional unit of the army.
Figure X shows the formal chain of command of the U.S. Army down
to the level of the division. This organization is primarily used in the
United States and is not necessarily used in foreign zones of operation.
The Commander of the United States Army is the President, who is
a civilian, as are the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army.
Prom the Chief-of-Staff on down it is a completely military organization.
The commander of a division is usually a major (two-star) general.
The chain of command is a formalized part of the organization.
All orders and information are expected to flow up and down the chain of
command as shown inJ^lgureX. Any major deviation by any of the military
commanders from this chain of command is punished by reprimand or removal.
The mission of all levels of the U.S. Army is formally written, as is the
chain of command; every member of the military organization knows his role

8
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FTSmE 1

THE CHAIN OP COMMAND OP A DIVISION

Commander-in-Chief:
President of the United States

Secretary of Defense
and
Secretary of the Army

Chief-of-Staff
U.S. Army

Poxirth Army:
Covers a Geographical Part of the U.S

III Corps:
Corps Usually Control Two Divisions

Division
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and his f•unction in the chain of command. Although there is usually an
informal chain of command that springs up from time to time, it has no
bearing on this discussion.

The Structure of a Division
Figure 2i shows the major parts of a division.

The smaller units

of the division, such as the corqjany and the platoon, are not included
because they are not necessary to this analysis.
The mission of the three Brigades is to confront the eneiny and
defeat him through the use of close combat and fire control. They are
made up of Armor (Tank) Battalions and Mechanized Infantry Battalions,
The Brigades are so built that they serve as building blocks in which the
Armor and Infantry Battalions can be combined to arrive at the correct
proportion of the two combat arms at the objective.
Division Artillery gives direct fire support to the three Brigades,
Each of the three Brigades has an Artillery Battalion in direct support of
its Battalions,

One Artillery Battalion, with heavier guns, generally

supports the whole Division, as does a Missile Battalion.
Support Command gives direct logistical, medical, and transportational support to all of the Division. It also has an Administration
Company in which are located most of the clerical workers in the Division.
Division Troops consists of a group of units that also give direct
support to all the elements within the Division. The Engineer Battalion
primarily supports the three Brigades and Division Artillery in the accom
plishment of their missions.

The Signal Battalion and Military Police

Company support Division Headquarters in maintaining contact with and

11
FIGURE 2'

STRUCTURE OP A DIVISION
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order in higher and lower units. The Headquarters Company houses all of
the personnel in the Divisional Staffs as well as the Commanding General
himself. Its primary mission is to provide the necessities of life to
the Headquarters and to provide transportation for it. The Data Processing
Detachment is a new unit which provides mobile computer service to the
Division; it is mostly used in the personnel and logistics fields.
The Headquarters of the Division is fcomposed of two staffs. The
first} the Special Staff, works directly for the Commanding General and
reports directly to him. It consists of the Staff Judge Advocate, who
is responsible for all matters dealing with military law throughout the
Division; and the Inspector General, who reports all complaints and wrongs
doings throughout the Division and also inspects for defects within the
organization. The General Staff is responsible for four different areas
of responsibility and is coordinated by and reports to the Chief-of-Staff,
who, in turn, reports to the Commanding General. The G-1 is responsible
for everything that has to do with personnel; the G-2 is responsible for
intelligence gathering and use; the G-3 plans all operational missions
and coordination throughout the Division; the G-4 is responsible for the
logistics supply of the Division. All of the Special and General Staff
have no authority over the line managers, but can only advise the Com
manding General of the correct policies and procedures.

Areas of the G--1 Office

Now that the organization of the Division has been

"the

discussion of the G-1 Office will follow. E%ttire 3 shows its various
areas.
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FIGWE ^

AREAS OF THE G-1 OFFICE

Headquarters
Company
Commander

G-1 Office
"G-1 Officer"
Assistant
G-1

Assistant
G-1
Manpower

Assistant
G-1
Readiness

Assistant
Gr—1
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Special
Staffs

Adjutant
General
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Division
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Division
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Headquarters
Commandant

The mission of the G-1 Office is to provide advice and counsel
to the Division Commander on all personnel actions which occur in the
Division. It also provides service and help to the entire Division in
all areas dealing with personnel except military law and complaints, which
go to the Special Staff. The G-1 Officer, Adjutant General, Finance
Officer, Division Chaplain, Surgeon, and Provost Marshall are all of the
same rank, but their chain of command goes through the G-1 Officer.

All

of these men are regarded as Staff Officers.
The following is a brief statement on the mission of each element
under the G-1 Office. Each element has its own office.
Adjutant General: Controls enlisted placements and keeps all personnel
records within the Division. He heads a 450-man section.
Finance Officer: Controls all payrolls and monies within the Division;
heads a lOO-Hman section.
Provost Marshall: Controls all police transactions within the Division;
commands a 200-man section.
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Division Chaplain; Advises the G-l of spiritual needs within the Divi
sion; heads a 10-man section.
Division Surgeon; Advises the G-1 of the medical needs within the Divi
sion; is a medical doctor and heads a
section.
Headquarters Commandant; Responsible to the G-1 for the upkeep of the
Divisional Headquarters; heads a 5-roan section and is a
Captain.
Headquarters Company Commander; Responsible for the operation of the
Headquarters Company; is not in the formal chain of command,
but is placed under the G-1 for supervision.
The following individuals work under the G-1 Office.
G-1 Officer; Is responsible to the Chief-of-Staff for the entire opera
tion of the G-1 Office as well as subordinate offices.
Assistant G-1; Coordinates and supervises the work of the G-1 Office.
Assistant G-1 (Manpower); Determines the placing of all Officer and
Warrant Officer replacements, keeps records on position and
performance of all Officers and Warrant Officers in the Divi
sion, keeps higher headquarters informed on the personnel
needs of the Division and functions as an informal watchdog
over the enlisted men's placements by the Adjutant General.
This job also requires constant communication with all lower
headquarters.
Assistant G-1 (Readiness); Prepares reports to higher headquarters as
to the personnel situation of the Division. This job also
requires him to help the Manpower Officer determine personnel
shortages throughout the Division.
Assistant G-1 (Safety): Is responsible for ensuring that all Safety Rules
and Regulations are observed in the Division, investigates ac
cidents, heads a program designed to send a large amount of
men to a local college and trade school to prepare them for a
civilian occupation.
These positions are all that of Junior Officers, except the G-1 Officer
who is a Lieutenant Colonel, and the Assistant G-1 who is a Major. There
also are six to ten enlisted men who assist these officers.

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS* ORGANIZATION

History
The history of the National Farmers* Organization (hereinafter
referred to as the NFO) has been short and stormy.

As an organization,

it was formed in 1958 in the raidwestem state of Iowa, and it has been
only in the most recent years of its development that it has spread over
the adjoining 4? states.

The chief problem accounting for the NFO*s

existence is the low commodity prices for farm products; low price levels
having been the rule since the early 1950s,

The NFO was founded origi

nally to use political processes, largely lobbying, as a means of better
ing farm prices; it changed its emphasis to collective bargaining with
food processors, however, when it fo\md that politicians could not or
would not help alleviate the farmers* basic problem of poor prices. In
many instances, the problems of the more densely populated urban centers—
with their large numbers of votes—interest the politicians far more than
do the sparsely populated rural areas. Oi^ in those states >rtiere large
urban areas have failed to develop are politicians interested in the far
mers* political power.
At various times since its inception, the NFO has called "holding
actions" (strikes) against various food processing firms when collective
bargaining has failed to bring about prices which the farmer judges as

15
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fair.

A holding action is just what the name implies:

farmers hold their

production off the market in an effort to force food processors to come
to terms.

Unfortiinately, holding actions are often acconq^anied by NFO

members' destroying their commodities to show their dissatisfaction.

The

shooting of swine, dumping of milk, and burning of potatoes have been and
are much more interesting to the public and the mass media than are the
agreements reached through peaceful collective bargaining between the NFO
and the food processing industry.

Therefore, the NPO has gained a reputa

tion of being a somewhat radical, destructive organization. It must be
pointed out, however, that the NFO is following the principle of collec
tive bargaining adhered to hy labor unions and business concerns.

The

NFO is the tangible result of efforts by independent farmers to become
organized in order to con5)ete in an increasingly organized world.
The number of members in the NFO is a closely kept secret, as
is usuiilly the case in most organizations which are starting out in a
hostile environment.

A "bluff is still en^jloyed when dealing with a food

processor who does not know the number and strength of the NFO farmers who
provide him with raw materials.

It is known, however, that the NFO has

become one of the largest farm organizations in America. At the NFO's
last national convention it drew over 12,000 farmers from all parts of
the country.
Farming has long been viewed by the American public as one of the
most peaceful and non-aggressive areas of American society.

Many people

still think of an agricultural career as a peaceful and contented life
close to "mother nature," In other words, farming is thought to be an
institution which has not acquired the "dog-eat-dog" characteristics of
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the rest of American society. However, the increasing migration of
farmers from rural areas to urban centers, and the increasing size of
each farm (production unit), are not indicative of a very peaceful or
content industry.
Mission
fhe theory of the HPO is fairly simple. It does not bxiy or own
anything; it merely acts as intermediary between the farmer and his mar
ket. It invokes a procedure used by labor, collective bargaining, to
gain a better position for farmers in the American society. The farmer's
right to use collective bargaining is guaranteed by the Capper-Volstead
Act passed by Congress in 1922. If this process fails, then a holding
action (strike) is called which forces the food processing industry to
come back to the mediating table with a better offer in order to get the
raw materials it needs to operate. The holding action is recognized as
an extreme means to be used only after all other means are exhausted.
Once an MPO contract has been agreed upon between the farmer and
the food processing industry, it has been noted that the market prices
rise over the agreed base price because other food processors not in the
agreement feel they have to pay more to attract commodities away from the
contracted food processor. Thus, the non-member farmer may initially
benefit more from the agreement than does the NFO member who is contracted
at a set price. The following year, however, the UFO farmer can arbitrate
for the highest price offered by other food processors. As is the nature
of arbitration under collective bargaining, neither side will get exactly
what it wants; each will compromise for something in between the two
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extremes. The important thing is that a hase price has been established
(which never existed before in agriculture) from which both sides can work
out agreements to their mutual benefit.
Marketing is also an important part of the KFO program. Pri
marily} this means getting commodities frcan the areas where a surplus
exists to those areas where the commodity is in demand. Thus, a complete
knowledge of the national and international markets must exist in the NFO.
Structtire of the NFO

Now that the history and the philosophy of the NFO have been
outlined, the stnicture of the NFO can be explored. It is almost im
possible to draw an organizational chart without showing the members as
being both above and below the organization. The reason for this is that
the members run the organization and, at the same time, are serviced by
the organization.
The NFO has not had the time, the capital, or the need to develop
into as complete an organization as the Army. The commodity departments
(grain, meat, and dairy) are still in an embryonic stage of development.
Generally, a specialist must be added to the department for each commodity;
for example, in the grain department one each is needed for wheat, barley,
corn, and so on. The Field Staff has almost reached the zenith of its
developnent because members are necessary first to make finances and com
modities available to the Commodity Dei)artment.

19
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SmUCTDEE OP THE KFO
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•Dotted lines represent informal communication.
The following is a brief statement of the functions of the various
elements of the UFO.
National Convention: Each year members elect delegates to represent them
at the national convention. The primary duty of the conven
tion is to set policy for the coming year and to elect a
president and a board of directors.
President; Is responsible for the entire operation of the NFO, appoints
the Field Staff Supervisor, key Commodity Department personnel,
and Marketing Area Chiefs. All of these individuals are
salaried employees.
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Board of Directors; Is responsible for overseeing the President and nnist
approve all of his major actions. The number of Board members
varies with membership.
Commodity Department; Carries on collective bargaining and marketing
activities for the NFO. Its responsibility is subdivided into
three areas (grain, meat, and dairy) to deal with specific
commodities. Each subdivision has a separate supervisor who
works independently of the others. The present number of em
ployees within the entire depajrtment is
people.
Marketing Area Chief;
Department
and market
staff of 4

Acts as a communication link between the Commodity
and the County Cell. At times he can also barter
commodities within his own area. He has a small
to 6 employees.

Zones: For all practical purposes, this organizational level is only
designated and rarely used for any purpose.
County Cell; Is the basic unit of the HPO. It mirrors the National Head
quarters in struct\ire except that all officers are elected
farmers from within the county serving without pay and there
is no Field Staff Department. The primary purposes of the
county cells are to inventory all commodities for sale ujider
the NFO, to elect delegates to the National Convention, to
inform the national organization of grass-roots feelings on
important NFO matters, and to encourage non-inembers to join
the organization.
Field Staff Supervisor; Is responsible for the recruitment of new NFO
members, the collection of old dues, and the selection and
training of Field Staff employees. He has a small staff of
5 to 8 employees to help him maintain contact with the mar
keting area supervisors.
Marketing Area Field Staff Supervisor; Is responsible for recruitment
and dues collection in an area about the size of a political
state. One to ten, or sometimes more, organizers work under
a supervisor, alone or in teams, depending upon the amount of
territory to be covered and the attitude of the farmers in the
area.
NFO Organizer: Is the official "salesman" of the organization. He meets
directly with the farmer to sell the organization, to provide
incentives to old members, and at times, to collect bad debts
such as late dues or handling costs.

PART TWO

CHAPTER IV

AN EXAMINATION OP TH(MPSON*S FIRST
PROPOSITION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Meaning
The oi)en-system theory of organizational "behavior defines an or
ganization as a grouping of interdependent parts which work together
toward the goal of producing the goods and/or services upon which the
whole siirvives.

This definition is supported by Chris Argyris' statement|

"An organization is characterized by an arrangement of parts that form a
7

unity or whole which feeds back to help maintain the parts."

There arei

however, certain of these organizational parts which are more significant
than others.

These parts comprise the organization's essence; they pro

duce those goods and/or services which are necessary for goal-achievement.
Without these parts, the organization could not exist.

These essential

parts of an organization can be referred to as the organization's core.
The core defines the organization's function.

The core element defines

the organization's essence and goals; logically, it also provides the
governing hierarchy that directs the organization toward its goals.

An

automobile company must produce cars, trucks, and spare partsj without
7
'Chris Argyris, "Understanding Human Behavior in Organizations:
One Viewpoint," in Modern Organization Theory, ed. by Mason Haire (New
York; John Wiley &S01K, Inc., 1959)» P» 125.
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these there would be no need for such other organizational parts as
dealers, purchasing departments, or service departments. Therefore,
the assembly line which manufactures cars, trucks, and spare parts is
the core of an automobile company.

Unless the core functions in the

best possible way, the organization will not be maximally useful either
to itself or to society,

A simple example of the importance of this

producing part is that during a strike of the assembly-line workers in
which the supply of cars, trucks, and spare parts is cut off, the re
maining parts of the automobile conqjany soon become unable to function
properly.
While the core of an organization is especially significant, the
other necessary and sometimes vital parts of the organization (such as
the above-mentioned dealers, purchasing departments, and service depart
ments of an automobile con^jar^r) have functions which must also be defined.
These parts have duties which deal with the inputs and/or outputs of the
core.

They either purchase the inputs (purchasing department) or sell the

outputs (dealers) or maintain the inputs and outputs (service departments).
It can be suggested, therefore, that these parts support the functions of
the core; therefore, they function as the supporting parts of the organi
zation.
It is now possible to visiialize an organization as having two
divisions, as is shown in the following diagram (Figiire 5).

This diagram

will clarify the separateness of these two organizational divisions.
The differentiating characteristics of the core and support parts are
that the core elements contain the organization's essence, because they:
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(a) produce the organization's goods and/or services;
(b) achieve the organization's goal(s);
(c) ensure organizational survival; and
(d) include the upper echelons of the organizational hier
archy, the governing part of the core, which possesses
the power to make and legitimize the policy that de
fines the goals of the core elements.
The support elements maintain the organization's essence because they:
(a) provide the core's inputs;
(b) circulate the core's outputs; and
(c) service and balance the core's inputs and outputs.

SUPPORT
ELEMENTS

CORE
UTPUT

INPUTS
ELEMENTS

Figure 5—Organizational Divisions

As suggested above, an organization must direct its core toward
some goal(s).

Warren G, Bennis postulates that "Organizations are pri

marily conqilex goal-seeking units."®

Therefore, organizations structure

®Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations. Alfred P, Sloan School
of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (New York; McGrawHill Book Conqxany, 1966), p, 7.
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their cores toward goal-achievement, and as S. Avery Raube maintains,
9

"The objective determines the structure needed."

The supporting parts

of the organization will also be structured to help the core parts achieve
the organization's goal.

The automobile company structures its core

(assembly line) to achieve its objective of producing cars, trucks, and
spare parts.

The supporting parts of the company also structure them

selves so as to facilitate the passage and maintenance of inputs and
outputs.
In order to produce goods or services, an organization's core
must also contain a working knowledge and strategy with respect to these
important functions.

In other words, the organization's core must use

some form of an art or craft, which is technology.

This knowledge and

strategy make up an organization's core technology. Core technology refers
to the basic knowledge and strategy used by an organization's core to
produce the principal goods or services upon which the whole organization
survives.

A manufacturing company's core, for example, must use knowl

edge relevant to the processing of raw material into finished goods.
If there exists a core technology for the core elements of the
organization, there also must exist a support technology to be used by
its support elements to produce the support necessary for the core to
function. The manufacturing company, for example, must use support tech
nology to get the necessary raw materials to the core from the environment
and to transport and sell the finished goods to the consumer.

Also, there

may be a need for additional support technologies within this same company;

^S. Avery Raube, "Principles of Good Organization," in Readings
in Management, ed. by Max D. Richards and William A. Nielander (2nd ed;
New York: South-Western Publishing Company, 19^3)f P» 667.
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for example, it may become advantageous for the company to open a cafe
teria to improve employee relations.

This cafeteria would not be directly

related to the support technology maintaining the organizational core,
however.

It is, therefore, possible for the company to eliminate this

cafeteria without appreciably harming the functions of its support ele
ments or those of the company's core.

Thus, scane support technologies

will be more necessary and vital to the functioning of the organization
than will others.
An important factor which complicates the organization's attempts
to use its elements and technologies to achieve its goal is its environ
ment.

For every organization there exists an environment specific to

that particular organization.

An organization's competitors, market,

supply of raw materials, etc., all comprise its environment.

Another

example is that of the G-1 Office, which is located within a very unique
environment—^that of the Army itself. As was shown in Figure 5, the en
vironment is external to the organization; therefore, the organization
has limited control over it.

While the organization's external environ

ment may have elements within it which range from hostile to friendly,
the fact remains that without inputs from the environment the organiza
tion could not exist, and without a place in the environment for its out
puts there would be no need for the organization to exist. As Daniel
Katz and Robert L. Kahn visualize it, "Open-system theory with its entropy
assumption emphasizes the close relationship between a structure and its
supporting environment, in that without continued inputs the structure
would soon run down.

On the other hand another major relationship
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encompassed by a system is the processing of production inputs to yield
some outcome to be utilized ty some outside group or system,"^®

The

entropy assun^jtion is that there must exist a quantity of energy that
supports a system.

For the above reasons, the environment is a tremen

dously powerful force in the life of an organization whether it is friendly,
hostile, or indifferent.
Thus, the organization is confronted with an environment which
it can only partially control. If the organization is to survive, it must
interact with certain elements within its environment to ensure a supply
of inputs ard a place for its outputs. Therefore, an organization and
elements of its environment are always Interactingi th^ are interdepen
dent, and have varying degrees of influence over one another. Influence
is the power ei^er of an organization or of the elements of its environ
ment to produce an effect upon the other. It is quite possible for the
environment to refuse either to supply inputs, or to accept the outputs
of an organization.

Thus, the environment is affecting the life of the

organization in a negative manner, due to the presence of negative entrtjjy.

Thus, because the organization wishes to sturvive, it will do

everjrthing possible to reduce the degree of negative influence that the
environment has over it.

The organization is caught in a dilemma; it

must interact with the environment for its inputs and outputs, but it
must keep the environment's negative influence at a minimum.

^^Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Soc^l Psychology of Organi
zations (New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 9.
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If an organization wishes to survive, it must possess some means
of defense against the negative aspects of the environment. Before an
organization can defend itself competently, it must first control itself.
A method by which it can both defend and control itself is sealing off
its core technology. Sealing off prevents the loss of the knowledge and
strategy of production (core technology) due to invasions by elements of
the environment.

Sealing off also ensures that an organization has maximum

control over itself.

While the organization interacts with the environ

ment , it restricts its parts and individuals from certain actions which
it believes are harmful to itself; therefore, the organization is internally
protecting itself as well as increasing its control.
An organization cannot absolutely seal off its core technology;
there is no certain way to prevent knowledge and/or strategy from leaking
out of the organization nor to prevent meddling with the organization by
outside sources.

Sealing off the core technology of an organization is

a continuous process of control and defense by which the company tries to
limit or minimize damaging influences on its core technology from outside
of the organization.
It is in the light of the above discussion that Thompson's first
proposition can be advanced and explored. "Under norms of rationality,
organizations seek to seal off their core technologies from environmental
influences."

11

11

Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 19.
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Application to the Field Staff of the MFO
In order to apply the first proposition to the Field Staff of the
NFO| it is necessary to define the formal relationship of the Field Staff
to the core technology of the MPO.

As was noted in the definition of an

organization, it must produce goods or services in order to survive.

The

NFO's goal is to produce higher commodity prices for member farmers
through the process of collective bargaining.

Collective bargaining fol

lows these steps;
(1) The farmer takes an inventory of the commodities he
wishes to sell through the MFO;
( 2 ) He sends his inventory to the appropriate county meat,
dairy, or grain chairman;
(3) The different county chairmen total the commodities
to be sold within their county;
(4) The totals are sent to the Marketing Area Chief;
(5) The Marketing Area Chief forwards them to the National
Commodity Department of the HFO;
(6) The National Commodity Department begins to barter with
separate meat, dairy, and grain processors for the sale
of these commodities;
(7) An agreement is reached between the Commodity Department
and the processor;
(8) A contract is sent by the Commodity Department and the
processor through the Marketing Area Chief to the
separate counties; and
(9) Each farmer member in a county decides whether or not
he wishes to ratify the contract.
If he does ratify the contract, arrangements are made to move his com
modities.

If he refuses to ratify the contract he may then sell as he

pleases on the open market. The different county chairmen, the Marketing
Area Chief, and the National Commodity Department work out the details
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concerning the transportation of the comnrodities, the location of scales,
etc.

This process can be shortened by the Marketing Area Chiefs who may

know of local processors and can negotiate with them. If an agreement is
reached by the Marketing Area Chief, he must notify the National Commodity
Department,

Because the complete process of collective bargaining is

carried on, or supervised by, the Commodity Department, its knowledge and
strategy are the core technology of the NFO. It must be vinderstood that
the policies formulated by the president and board of directors are also
included within this core technology.
The Commodity Department cannot, however, produce higher commodity
prices tinless they have members who have agreed to give their support and
to pool their commodities through the NPO. Without commodities there
wovild be nothing for the Commodity Department to offer in exchange.

Sup

port in this instance is of a financial nature; the farmer contracts to pro
vide either $75 a year for three years or one percent (IjJ) of the gross
proceeds from any commodity which he sells through the NTO in exchange for
the service (collective bargaining) of the Commodity Department.
It is the f\mction of the Field Staff to recruit farmers who will
furnish both support and commodities for the Commodity Department.

Thus,

the Field Staff which penetrates the agriculttiral community (environment)
in order to recruit members performs an environmental function for the
Commodity Department.
In addition, the Field Staff maintains the core elements (Com
modity Departments) of the NFO 1:^ visiting farmers who have not paid their
dues or who have not moved commodities through the Commodity Department to
indicate their dissatisfaction with the NFO's performance.

It is the

fimc-tion of the Field Staff to persuade these people to recommit them
selves to the organization.

This process is often almost impossible;

non-complying processors often increase their market prices to attract
HPO members away from the HPO's contracted price, and occasionally, the
market price naturally goes above that negotiated by the KFO. The farmer,
in these instances, can see no value in buying the Commodity Department's
services.
In order to function, the Field Staff must also have a technology
which alloxijs it to recruit members and collect dues for the core. This
technology will be called a support technology, because it supports the
core.
It must also be pointed out that while a Field Staff employee is
recruiting farmers or collecting old dues, he is also providing certain
services to the farm community which are not directly related to Field
Staff functions. He carries news concerning crop reports, births, deaths,
and weddings to all i)arts of his territory.
leader.

He may become a community

The Field Staff employee's biggest contribution in this area,

however, is the least visible, because he provides human contact and con
versation to a generally lonesome rural population.
The Field Staff formally functions as a supplier of inputs (mem
bers) to the Commodity Department, and it also acts to maintain the supply.
One becomes increasingly aware of the importance of these functions as
the condition of the organization is explored informally, because the Com
modity Department has not yet even developed into a self-supporting part
of the organization.

A large majority of American farmers refuse to trust

the marketing ability of the Commodity Department.

As a result, the one
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percent (I5S) mark-off charged farmers ty the Commodity Department for
its service has not generated enough revenue to cover its cost of opera
tion.
This situation is primarily the result of three factors;
(1) Not enough farmers joined the NFO at its inception
to offer a great amoTint of support or commodities to
the Commodity Department;
( 2 ) It takes a great deal of time, once support and com
modities are available, to build up an organization
capable of dealing with all commodities on a nation
wide scale (one or more market experts usually must
be added to the Commodity Department for each commodity
such as peas, wheat, hay, feed cattle, etc.); and
( 3 ) Food processors can ignore the agreements offered by
the SoBimodity Department because it has few commodities
to offer, and has had very little farmer support.
The Commodity Department could not threaten to cut off the flow of com
modities to an uncooperative processor. Thus, a unique situation exists
within the NFO; its core elements are not f\illy functioning and are not
providing enough services for the organization to survive. The Field
Staff has overcome this difficTilty by providing enough funds through mem
bership drives and the collection of old dues to enable the organization
to s\irvive.
It could, therefore, be logically argued that the NPO's core is
not achieving its goal of better farm prices.

The NFO has had to shift

its goal priorities from increased farm commodity prices through collec
tive bargaining to dues collection in order to survive.

As such, the

knowledge and strategy used by the Field Staff has become more important
to the organization than dcQlect±v»%B'^adii4ng.
situation will not long be tolerated

Needless to say, this

a member,

A farmer joins the
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NFO for the services of the Commodity Department (higher commodity
prices through collective bargaining) not for endless membership and
dues collection drives by the Field Staff,

Thus, the long-term sur

vival of the NFO depends upon the Commodity Department's using its
core technology to gain better farm prices.
The NFO*s actual goal at present is the establishment of the
Commodity Department as its functioning core element.

Until that goal

is reached, the NFO will not be a very effective organization.

It can,

however, keep the environment from destroying it by generating support
through the Field Staff,

As such, its support technology has become

more important at the present time than its core technology.
In order to apply the rest of Thompson's first proposition, it
*

is necessary to examine how the Field Staff seeks to seal off the NFO's
goal-oriented core technology (contained in the Commodity Department) and
its support technology from environmental elements.

There are basically

three different methods used to protect these technologies. The first
method is simply the recruitment by the Field Staff of as many farmers as
possible into the NFO,

The advantage of this method is that an increase

of support and commodities from a larger membership allows the Commodity
Department to develop into a functioning core element; members give it
both the power needed to deal with uncooperative processors and the
revenues gained from commodity transactions needed to support NFO growth.
If the Commodity Department becomes increasingly successful in negotiating
for higher fam prices, the Field Staff will be able to portray this
success for non-member farmers. Because nothing sells better than success.
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recruitment will then become easier for the Field Staff. In both the
core element and its supportive body, increased membership means increased
organizational power to deal with its environment.

Power, in turn, can

ty used by the NFO to defend against loss or escape of its core technology
to harmful elements, or its being undermined by them.

A processor will

have to agree to collective bargaining with the Commodity Department when
he knows his supply of commodities will be almost totally cut off. He
will no longer be able to hinder the fiinctioning of the core technology
of the NFO.

The processor was meddling with the NFO's core technology by

not letting it operate upon his inputs (commodities); he also meddled in
the Field Staff's support technology by not giving any positive assurance
to farmers in his area that joining the NFO co\ild result in higher prices.
Thus, he was indirectly blocking Field Staff membership drives.

Once a

contract is successfully negotiated with the processor ty the Commodity
Department, his roadblock to increasing membership for the NFO is de
stroyed.

This first method of sealing off organizational technologies

is the most iii5)ortant; unless the NFO can acquire enough inputs to become
powerful, it >/ill not be able

successfully function within its environment.

The two remaining methods of sealing off organizational techno
logies are related because they both deal with the Field Staff's efforts
to defend its own knowledge and strategy from environmental elements.
In order to understand these methods, however, it is necessary to examine
the educational process by which an employee becomes a functioning Field
Staff member.

There are two means of acquiring the knowledge and strategy of the
NFO's support technology. First, there is the use of a classified pam
phlet outlinir^ the procedures to use in recruiting farmers and collect
ing old dues; second, there is a week-long class held by Field Staff
Instructors for all new en^jloyees, covering basically the same material
as is contained in the pamphlet, with class practice to inqjrove the field
performance of the en^loyee.

Both the panqjhlet and the class cover the

trade secrets of the support technology by outlining correct methods to
make the farmer more receptive to the Field Staff employee's ideas.
selling techniques covered by both modes of instruction are:

Some

the correct

opening address by the employee to put the farmer at ease and capture his
attention, the proper words to use to impress and captivate the farmer,
the degree of dress needed to ensure the enqiloyee's respectability (both
suits and levis are unsuitable), and the proper closing statement by the
employee ("You want to join the NFO, don't you?").

In both the class and

the pamphlet instructions, the employee is required to memorize a routine
that incorporates all of these tactics. The class method goes beyond
the paraphlet by requiring class practice of the routine, and it includes
more complete instruction on the farmers* problems and the NFO's ideas
for rectifying them.

Also, because a new enqjloyee has a chance to see

the national headquarters in action, he will have a more detailed idea
of the ftinctioning parts of the NPO.

Because of the advantages of the

class method, all new en^aloyees are now required to attend it.

While a

week may seem a short amount of time, it is fairly exhaustive and can
tvirn a city-born employee into a knowledgeable member of the rural-oriented
Field Staff.
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Now it is possible to examine the relationship between this educa
tional process and the remaining two secondary methods of sealing off
organissational technologies practiced by the Field Staff.

A second seal

ing off method is the previously mentioned classification of the Field
Staff's instructional pamphlet.

Classification keeps the knowledge and

strategy of the supporting technology restricted to the individuals who
must have knowledge of it in order to function within the organization.
The reasons for the Field Staff's efforts to classify or restrict its
knowledge and strategy are to prevent the loss or escape of its core
technology to other farm organizations, and to keep farmers from knowing
the methods used to recruit them.

Naturally, the Field Staff does not

want successful methods lost to con^etition; a great deal of time and
money has been invested into their development, and the Field Staff feels
that its technology is superior to that of others.

Therefore, it impels

its employees, under threat of job loss, to hold this information, unique
to the organization, secret. Farmers are a very suspicious lot; if they
knew the many subtle methods used by the Field Staff to recruit them,
they would probably resent the Field Staff recruiters and resist the NFO.
A third method used by the Field Staff to seal off its technology
involves using its members* expertise.

A member's expertise is the result

of the training class and his experience in recruiting farmers.

Working

in the field with the farmer allows the Field Staff member to discuss the
entire spectrum of farm problems.

Thus, his knowledge grows until he can

discuss farm problems on an equal footing with arQrone.

Expertise of the

Field Staff member permits him to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
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of the support technology by using his acquired knowledge to develop new
or better methods of recruitment and collection.

Thus, he is also ef

ficiently contributing to the first method of sealing off, that of in
creasing UFO membership.
Also a knowledgeable member can better seal off the support tech
nology because he can identify harmful elements within the environment,
and can devise defenses against them.

Another organization or a powerful

individual may wish to prevent the Field Staff from recruiting members in
an area because the NFO will bring in unwanted corqaetition.

These organi

zations or individuals are very subtle, and an inexperienced or ignorant
Field Staff member may not know of their opposition.

An experienced and

knowledgeable Field Staff member, however, will recognize the extent of
the organizational or individual opposition, and he can develop a scheme
of action to expose the true reasons for the opposition of these groups.
This process of defense may become a battle between the Field Staff mem
ber and his opposition, but, usually, the Field Staff will be able to
continue recruitment of farmers or collection of dues in an area. Thus,
the expertise of the Field Staff member enables the knowledge and methods
of the support technology to function despite opposition.
It must also be pointed out that harmful environmental elements
may not wish to oppose or to attack an organization when it is known that
experts hold important positions within the defending organization,

Who

wants to oppose an organization that has superior knowledge, especially
when it can only be attacked on its own ground?

Therefore, expertise
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within an organization's membership can become an important defense in
itself, because it reduces attacks and opposition from harmful environ
mental elements.
The Field Staff does not need to defend itself or the NFO as
forcefully from environmental elements which may have beneficial or neutral
influences.

While on the road, a Field Staff member often trades informa

tion with other traveling salesmen who also work extensively with rural
populations.

During such encounters, knowledge and strategy which are

necessary to the Field Staff's support technology are often exchanged
with outside elements for portions of their technology.

The process is

mutTially beneficial. Items that are often exchanged include:

correct

modes of dress, political remarks to avoid, road conditions, financial
conditions of a certain area, and social and ethnic differences.

All of

these items are important if the Field Staff member is to expand the tech
nology he utilizes in the field.

As a result of such informal meetings, a

Field Staff member can better utilize his support technology to expedite
the recruitment or collection processes.

All parties to such informal

meetings can be somewhat assured that information traded will be kept
within the informal salesman group, because all parties fear leakage of
their methods and knowledge to farmers. Farmers' awareness of such infor
mation could easily result in their alienation.
Also, local political or commiinity leaders who support the NFO are
often invited
members.

a Field Staff member to participate in the recruitment of

These individuals are given a certain part of the sales routine

usually covered by the Field Staff member.

They are especially valtiable

in reducing the farmer's uneasiness toward the Field Staff employee who
is often a stranger. In any case, after several days of working with the
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staff employee, the leader will be better acquainted with the current
support technology.

In both cases, however, a Field Staff member shares

only enough of his technology to ensure that he will get the information
or cooperation that he wants from others.

Outside individuals are not

given access to many of the details which the Field Staff member feels
should be known only within the organization.

The reason for this action

is that the Field Staff employee cannot really trust outside individuals'
loyalty.

Application to the G-1 Office of an Army Division
Applying Thompson's first proposition to a division's G-1 Office
necessitates the definition of the functions of an Army and its divisions
in order to specify the core technology of these organizations.

The main

functions of an Army are to provide defense for the people, property, or
interests of a national state or its allies against hostile elements of
another national state(s) and to provide aid to civilian populations in
areas damaged by a natural disaster.

Therefore, an Army produces defense

or help for elements of its environment.

In return for these services by

the Arpy, the national state furnishes support in the form of manpower
and funds upon which the Army is dependent for its survival as an organ
ization.
The entire Army, however, is a very large and bulky organization
which necessitates its separation into various functional elements.

As

previously stated, the division is the main functional element within the
Army which can produce defense or aid.

A division usually can defend

people, territory, or interests with the use of its combat units
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(Armor, Infantry, and Artillery) or can supply aid to civilians in a
nattiral disaster hy relying upon its large inventory of manpower and
equipment.

There are various small units, such as Task Forces and Bri

gades, which can also undertake the functions of the Army, but they lack
the division's strength in manpower and equipment and are not commonplace,
HighBr level units such as Corps, Armies, and Army Groups function pri
marily to command, coordinate!^ maintain, and supply the divisions under
them.

These units rarely engage in the acttial provision of defense or

aid to elements of their environment.
Therefore, elements withinithe division must employ the core
technology of the Array, because their knowledge and strategy will pro
duce the products of the Amy—defense or aid. Figure

will be helpful

in visualizing the various elements as they are differentiated. The three
Brigades and the Division Artillery with their immediate hierarchy (the
Division Commander and his immediate aides) are the core elements of the
division.

Support Command and Division Troops are direct support elements,

but can function as core elements in extreme emergencies. If any one of
these specialized elements is not ftinctioning properly, the entire divi
sion in turn cannot function as desired.

The Signal Unit provides communi

cation throughout the core elements; without its support the command would
lose control over all of the elements, thereliqr jeopardizing the entire
division. If the supply and transportation element does not provide the
combat elements with such necessary materials as food, gas, or clothing,
the combat elements would not be able to defend or give aid.

Thus, the

division's core elements and the direct support elements are highly inter
dependent with one another, as will be explained later in more detail.
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The G-1 Office is instrumental in the formation and interpreta
tion of personnel policies and procedures by which the Command Section
regulates personnel matters within the division.

Now that the position

of the G-1 Office has been reviewed, its functions can be explored.

One

of the Gr-1 Office's main formal support functions is to provide personnelrelated services and advice to the core and direct support elements of
the division, especially the Division Command Section.

It is part of

the General Staff, which as the name implies is the Commanding General's
staff.

The G-1 maintains a roster of all officers and warrant officers

within the division and can move individuals from one Brigade to another
to maintain equality in numbers as well as in rank, in accordance with
the policy set by the Command Section.

The G-1 Office also advises and

services all other core elements of the division on personnel policy and
actions.

The commander of a Brigade may have an officer who must be

transferred out of the Brigade to avoid conflict within that unit. The
G-1 Office, with the approval of Division Command, will effect this
transfer.

Also, a Brigade or Battalion Commander may contact the G-1

Office to have policies or procedures clarified.
A second function of the G-1 Office is to command and coordinate
its special staffs (seeK.jgure '3 ).

The specialized offices of the Ad

jutant General, Finance Officer, Provost Marshall, Division Chaplain,
Division Surgeon, and Headquarters Commandant were created to deal with
the many facets of personnel.

All of these specialists are controlled by

the G-1 Office, and they report in their respective fields through the
G-1 Office to the Division Command Section.

They also help the G-1 Office

with advising and servicing the Command Section and the other core elements.
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and they aid in forming and interpreting policy and procedures within
their respective fields. For example, the Command Section in response
to the report of increased traffic accidents from the Provost Marshall
via the G-1 Office, may order the initiation of a drivers' education
class, the particulars of which will be arranged by the Provost Marshall's
Office subject to the approval of the Command Section.

The G-1 Office is

the communication link in this whole process and serves similarly with
its other special staffs. It may become necessary for the G-1 Special
Staff to report on pressing problems directly to the Division Commander.
The G-1 Officer will still accoitpany the special staff officer to meet
with the commander, and in some cases add his comments as to the nature
of the problem,
A third and most in^jortant function of the G-1 Office is the ac
quisition of replacements (irqjuts) to fill vacancies within the division.
Without manpower, the division would not be able to produce defense or
aid for the state. The G-1 Office and the Adjutant General's Office share
the responsibility of acquiring replacements by notifying, through per
iodic reports. Army personnel agencies of the personnel needs of the divi
sion,

The G-1 Office reports officer and warrant officer needs, and the

Adjutant General reports enlisted man needs. In addition, the G-1 Office
helps to maintain the replacements (inputs) once they arrive within the
division by providing services through its special staffs for the in^jrovement of a replacement's general welfare.

There are various specialized

areas in which a replacement may need help that are coordinated by the
G-1 Office,

For spiritual needs, the replacement can turn to the Division

Chaplain; for medical aid, the Division Surgeon; for police, the Provost

Marshall; for financial aid, the Finance Office; and matters of personnel|
the G-l Office or the Adjutant General's Office.

The special office of

Headquarters Commandant does not provide any service to a replacement,
"but it does support the Division Command Section and its headquarter staffs
by ensuring that desks, chairs, and lights are provided and are in clean,
working order.
The core and direct support elements of the division are sup
ported by the G-1 Office and its special staffs; these staff offices do
not directly produce defense or aid} thus, they do not use the knowledge
and strategy of the core technology. Instead, the G-1 Office must possess
a correct understanding of the core technology used by the core elements
if it is to service and advise them. Individuals within the G-1 Office
must understand military terminology, symbols, and maps or they will
neither be able to follow the movements or maneuvers of the core elements
nor to communicate with them. For this reason, officers trained in the
function of the combat units are the ones assigned to the G-1 Office.
While all of the G-1 functions are necessary to the core elements
of the division, just how vital they are is open to question. If the
functions of the G-1 Office were for some reason discontinued, the core
elements would surely find some way to carry on. However, the division
would have to decentralize its personnel operations.

Decentralization

would necessitate duplication of effort in each core element, and thus,
would raise the cost of administration throughout the division.

Also,

the Division Command Section would lose some control over the personnel
f\mctions of the core elements, because decentralization would allow

lower tinit commanders (at Brigade or Battalion levels) to implement per
sonnel policy and procedures.
Additional evidence that an Array can operate without the detailed
advice and services provided by the G-1 Office and its special staffs is
found in foreign armies. They often operate with a very small personnel
office and entrust the bulk of these functions to either higher or lower
units} in very new or primitive armies, there may be no personnel depart
ment whatsoever.
The G-1 Office and its special staffs may not be vital to the
core elements, but they do act as an important instrument by which the
core technology possessed by the core elements is sealed off from environ
mental influences.

In order to perceive how the G-1 organization accom

plishes this process, it is necessary to visualize it as a peripheral
organization acting between the core elements and the environment.

If a

higher •authority, such as a Corps Commander, questions the Division Com
mander's actions in a matter related to personnel, the G-1 Office helps
defend the Division Commander. The Corps Commander may feel that too
many Armor Officers are being assigned to a certain division, or he may
suspect that a division is deliberately reporting shortages of a certain
critical specialty. The G-1 Office could defend the Commander in the
first instance by providing a roster, by grade and position, of all the
Armor Officers within the division.

From such exact information, a de

fense can be formulated by the G-1 Office and passed on to the Division
Commander giving such reasons as that most of the Armor Officers with the
division are directly engaged in the functioning of core elements (Armor
Units) and their loss out of the division would have an adverse effect
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upon its ability to perform, or that a large number of Armor Officers
were found to be second lieutenants and as such are not as vital to the
fiinctioning of a core element as is an experienced officer of a higher
rank. In the first case, the Division Commander can argue with the Corps
Commander that a loss of Armor Officers will result in dysfunction within
his core elements; or in the second case, he can allow a certain number
of armor lieutenants to be taken from the Division with the knowledge that
their loss will not cause dysfunction. Thus, a Division Commander with
the knowledge given him ty the G-1 Office can better control his internal
affairs as well as defend his core elements from encroachment, thereby
sealing off his core technology.
A second means of sealing off the core technology offered to the
core elements

the G-1 Office and its special staffs is its large number

of specialists and experts.

These individuals represent such diverse

professions as physician (Division Surgeon), policeman (Provost Marshall),
personnel expert (Adjutant General), clergyman (Division Chaplain), and
payroll expert (Finance Officer). If an environmental force tries to in
fluence the core elements of the division in any of these fields, the en
vironmental force in most cases will be required to have an expert of its
own in each field.

A hostile iiKiividual who wishes to poison the food or

water of a core element would have to find some way of getting arovind the
inspection procedures established by the Division Surgeon.

Thus, the

professional Division Surgeon and each aspert can individually help to
seal off the core technology of the division.
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While the G-1 Office exerts efforts to seal off the core tech
nology, it also exerts a fair amount of effort to seal off its own support
technology and has, thereby, increased its power beyond that authorised
formally.

There are three attributes of the structure of a division

which have allowed this extension of power.

The discussion of these at

tributes will show that Thompson's first proposition may be applied to
explain the strategy of support technology as well as core technology.
Originally, the G-1 Office and its special staffs had very few functions
to perfonn for the core elements and were small and powerless entities.
The core elements carried on many of the various personnel-related fvinctions of the staff offices.

As the core elements' environment became

increasingly complex, a need developed for specialized personnel services.
Staff offices were created to provide these specialized services for the
core elements.

As a result, the core elements became increasingly de

pendent upon the staff offices for personnel-related advice and service.
The important staff service of providing and maintaining inputs (manpower)
to the core elements has especially developed core dependence upon the
staffs.

Without a stable supply of manpower the core elements could not

function to provide defense or aid.

Thus, the first attribute is the

increased complexity of the division which has developed due to the en
larged mission, increased record keeping requirements, scientific ad
vancements, and increased size of the core elements all of which work
together to necessitate a specialized personnel service.
The dependence of the core allows the staff elements to exert a
degree of influence over the core elements.

The more influence the staff

positions have upon the core elements, the more entrenched they become
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within the division. Shutting down the G-1 Office and its special staffs
would require the afore-mentioned decentralization.

Because core elements

do not wish to expend time and manpower upon such an undertaking, the
staffs will probably continue in their present tasks; their survival is
assured.
Another characteristic of a division that staff offices can use
to their advantage is the small size of the divisional Command Section.
It is impossible for the Division Commander or his few aides to oversee
all of the personnel functions carried on by the G-1 Staffs within the
division.

Thus, the staff offices have some freedom of action outside

the scrutiny of the Command Section. This somewhat autonomous sit\iation
allows the staffs to operate beyond the boundaries imposed upon them by
the Command Section. It is possible, because they control replacements
for the G-1 Office and the Adjutant General's Office, to take the best
officer and enlisted replacements for their own use.

Such a process may

dej^y the core elements the raw material necessary to them if they are to
function properly.

The Command Section may never discover this corrup

tion unless they physically interview the Office's personnel or look at
its records.

Because such acts are time-consuming, these offices can be

fairly sure that their corrupt acts will not be discovered.
The G-1 Office can, iii effect, seal off its technology from the rest
of the organization.

By putting its own interests above those of the core

elements, it seeks self-perpetuation.

The G-1 Office is often fvil]y staf

fed or overstaffed when core elements are unable to function properly be
cause of personnel shortages.

This sittiation is allowed by the Command

Section and the other core elements because without the proper ftinctioning
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of the G-1 Office the important input of mainover will not be forthcoming.
The Coimnander of the G-1 Office can, however, use this situation to en
large the amount of advice and service the office provides to the core
elements.

Thus, he is increasing both the importance of his office and

the dependency that the core elements have upon the G-1 Office.
A final peculiarity is the staff's position within the division.
The G-1 Office and its special staffs are close to and part of the center
of power, authority, and control possessed by the Division Command Sec
tion.

While a staff cannot give a command to a core element (only the

command element has this iaiportant power) the staffs do act as a communica
tion link between the core elements and the core command, as previously
described.
elements.

As such, a staff often speaks for the Commander to the core
It is, in fact, interpreting the Commander's orders for the

core elements.

A problem is encountered here, because the staff inter

pretation provided for the Commander to the core elements can easily be
interpreted by them to be exactly as he wishes. Thus, policies and proce
dures initiated ly a staff position without formal recognition from the
Division Commander are often taken by the other core elements as direct
orders from the Commander. In such cases, the staff is exceeding the
formal power given to it and is exercising a powerful influence over the
rest of the division.

Thus, staff positions can sometimes be discovered

acting despotically when they command other elements.
The G-1 Office often requires the core elements to follow its
directions on personnel-related matters, without the approval of the
Command Section, If the core elements do not question the legitimacy of
these directions, the G-1 Office can actually speak as the Commander in
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its field of personnel.

Most core elements recognize the informal posi

tion of power and authority of the General's Staff including the G-1 Of
fice.

Officers of a core element are often extremely nervous when a G-1

Officer visits their \init, because a General Staff Officer can easily
forwaird a damaging report about the core element directly to the Commander,
Thus,:a staff officer represents the eyes and ears of the Division Com
mander.
To stimmarize, then, due to these three factors—the increased
complexity of the environment, the smallness of the Command Section, and
the proximity of the staff to the Command Section—the G-1 Office and
its special staffS* functions within the division impel increasing de
pendence of the core elements upon the support elements.

In fact, the

support agencies can become almost as powerful and important as the core
elements.

This power enables them to seal off their support technology

from the environment and from their own organization.

The powerful posi

tion and the specialization of the G-1 Office and its special staffs fur
nish them the necessary influence to subvert the goals of the core. For
example, the goal of the division could be shifted from that of producing
defense and aid (which utilizes the core technology) to that of adminis
tration, thus replacing the core technology with the support technology.
If this switch occurred, it is even possible to state that these staff
offices operate as if they comprise the core rather than support elements.
The G-1 Office and its special staffs have knowledge and strategy
which is tinique to them.

Even the Division Command Section has trouble

understanding and penetrating these specialized areas.

The Division
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Commander has fairly limited knowledge in the specialized areas of the
medical or spiritual needs of the division.

Thus, he is hesitant to

question any acts of these offices and thereby show his ignorance.

In

this way, this specialization affords a second means by which the G-1 and
its special staffs seal off their environment, and also seal in their
knowledge.

The G-1 Office often has trouble managing its special staffs,

because it has no specialists.
Arm Branches.

Instead, its personnel are from the Combat

The G-1 Office overcomes this difficulty by training its

own personnel to become specialists. For example, the G-1 Readiness and
Manpower Officers are usually kept in their position(s) for a period of
two years so that they may become proficient enough to act as watchdogs
over the operation of the Adjutant General.

Thus, specialists are created

to watch over specialists.

Comparison

Both the Field Staff of the NFO and the G-1 Office of an Army
Division perform the function of seeking to seal off their respective
core technologies from outside influence.

While the modus operandi for

these organizational parts is very different, the end result is the same.
Therefore, these two very different organizations appear to support
Thompson's first proposition. For clarity it has been necessary to de
lineate the differences between an organization's core and support ele
ments and their respective technologies.

The core provides the organiza

tion's essence, while the support elements function as input and output
components and seal off the core elements' technology from environmental
influences.

In this way, these supporting elements have also become
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defense and control components.

In their expanded roles, these support

elements have achieved very important positions within their respective
organizations.

The functioning of the Field Staff is more important to

the NPO's short-run survival than is its core.

It is, therefore, critical

for the Field Staff to seek to seal off its own support technology from
the environment.

A critical problem in the life of the MFO v/ill be when

to switch the organization's reliance from the short-term survival of the
Field Staff to the long-term survival offered by the Commodity Department,
its core.

The G-1 Office can act as though it had a core function instead

of a support function.

It can act outside of the authority allowed to it

by the core, and can actually seal off its technology from its own core
organization.

An important problem in the life of a division is how to

prevent this support element from abusing its power.

If the NFO cannot

switch from support to core reliance for survival, and if the division
cannot control the functions of its support element, then the danger
exists that their cores will not be able to function properly, threaten
ing both goal achievement and siirvival.
In the light of the discussion of the support elements, Thompson's
first proposition may be restated to read, "Under norms of rationality,
an organization's core and support ccmiponents will seak to seal off all
technologies (both the core and the support technologies which the organ
ization perceives as necessary to its short- or long-term survival) from
environmental influences."

Occasionally, there is the possibility that

the support elements will be too efficient in sealing off either their
own or the core's technology.

The Field Staff can oversell the EPO by

recruiting more farmers than the Commodity Department can handle; the
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G-1 Office can overstaff itself by using more personnel and power than
is necessary for its proper functioning. In both cases, this causes the
core to assume a secondary position within the organization.
While it is easy to enlarge upon Thompson's first proposition,
it is hard to disagree with the philosophy contained within it. Basically,
an organization must survive within its environment.

The degree to which

the organization feels the need to survive varies with its degree of
establishment.

The relatively new HPO is somewhat unsure of its survival,

v;hereas the established Army division is almost guaranteed of its sur
vival.

Both organizations are stniggling within the environment to main

tain their self-control and to construct suitable defenses to seal off
their core technologies from influence.

Because the environment will

always attempt to undo the organizations' efforts to seal off these tech
nologies, the organizations can only seek a perfect state.
is a very primitive form of control and defense.

This method

The organization can

only seek to ensure its life; it cannot have an absolute guarantee upon
its life.

It must interact with the environment and accept the risks and

chances involved in survival.

CHAPTER V

A CONCISE DISCUSSION OF FOUR ADDITIONAL
PROPOSITIONS OF THOMPSON

Buffering
Since an organization cannot seal off its technical core completely
while maintaining its interaction with the environment for a supply of
inputs and a place for outputs, it must devise more complex methods of
controlling and defending itself against the environment.

The place to

carry on such methods is the boundary between the environment and the or
ganization.

In other words, the supporting elements (the input and output

components) become the focus for organizational control and defense against
the environment.

One of the biggest problems for the support elements is

defending against a fluctuating environment which causes the organization
to have a varying supply of inputs or outputs because of changes in the
environmental supply and demand. If an organization is to survive, it
must have some stability in its supply of inputs and demand for outputs.
Otherwise, its core will be either overextended or underworked.

In order

to increase its chances of survival, the organization can try to control
these environmental variations of its core's inputs and outputs by using
its support elements as a buffer,

A means of buffering used by the input

or output components of a manufactxiring company is the stockpiling of raw
materials or manufactured goods.

In this way, the core's inventory will

52

53
be steady in the face of fluctuations ins^nvironmental supply or demand.
As Thompson suggests in his second proposition, "Under norms of ration
ality, organizations seek to buffer environmental influences by surround-

12

ing their technical cores with input and output components."

As with

sealing off, an organization can only seek to buffer itself, because there
exists no sure way of guaranteeing that input and output components can
regulate environmental supply and demand.
The input component of the MFO is the Field Staff, whose purpose
is to provide farmer members for the dore and to maintain them once they
have joined the organization. There is no real output con^jonent within
the NFO, because the core itself (Commodity Department) produces higher
farm prices through collective bargaining.
these higher prices.

There is no way 6f stockpiling

Commodity agreements with processors are good only

for a short period of time and cannot be stored away for another day.
Because the Field Staff has few useful methods available to imple
ment it, buffering is carried on only in a limited fashion.
Staff will send some
iting members
The

employees

employees into

whose dues are
are, in

an area

to be paid

effect,

in

performing

with the
the next

preventive

The Field

purpose of

vis

couple of months.
maintenance

on the organization's membership. He is trying to make siure that members,
inputs, do not drop out of the organization.

Thus, he is trying to ensure a

steady flow of support and commodities from the member to the core; he is buffer'
ing the technical core.

Also, this preventive maintenance by the Field Staff

^^Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 20.
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enables it to forewarn the core of a drop in membership if it learns of
dissatisfaction.

It must be pointed out that unless the core performs

its function of raising farm prices, the Field Staff probably will not
be able to maintain the membership.

Farmer'members want results and not

just a friendly visit from the Field Staff.
An additional method of btiffering used by the NFO is the exten
sive training of its Field Staff employees in an effort to increase their
efficiency and effectiveness.

Also, Field Staff employees are titilized

ty their supervisors so as to allow them to develop their greatest poten
tial.

Both the training and the supervising of employees buffers the

core by allowing them the maximtrm knowledge necessary to deal with the
fluctuating environment.

One employee iaay have the persuasive talent

needed to talk dispirited members back into the NFO; another may be most
productive when sent into areas in which new membership drives are needed
or in which membership maintenance is necessary to maintain the core's
inputs.
The success of buffering by the Field Staff depends on the ef
fectiveness of the support technology which is used in training Field
Staff employees and the ability of the Field Staff employee to utilize
the support technology given him. Possible deficiencies of the support
technology include its incomplete development in so yoting an organization
and its inappropriateness for a given farmer or commxinity.

Even after ex

tensive training and supervising an employee may not be able (or may re
fuse) to utilize the support technology provided him ty the Field Staff or
he may simply not work, and ifimb»b^ond organizational control.

An organi

zational effort to btiffer the core which relies upon this type of individtial
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will fail.

To fulfill the organization's wish to buffer its core, it must

depend upon the efficiency of its support technology and upon the Indi•fidual Field Staff employee's ability to use his acquired knowledge to
deal with his environment and to take ot'ders from his superiors.

Buffer

ing by the Field Staff to protect the core is dependent upon the refining
of its support technology and the recruiting of employees who fulfill the
twin abilities mentioned above.

Even with 100/J effective technology and

en^^loyees (if this were possible), extreme environmental fluctxiations such
as have occurred in agriculttire over the years (19'l'O's boom, 1960's bust)
would probably acttially determine whether the buffering acts of the Field
Staff are successftil in protecting the core from environmental influences.
The G-1 Office is an input component of the division. It pro
vides replacements to the core, and advises and services the core.

The

core's environment, especially that of the Command Section, is such that
personnel-related inputs such as reports, awards, etc., come into it in
such great quantity that they all cannot be dealt with immediately.

The

variety of these items is also a factor because they include medical re
ports from the Division Surgeon, religious and morale reports from the
Chaplain, police reports from the Provost Marshall, and personnel-strength
levils, congressional correspondence, etc., from the Adjutant General's
Office.

In addition, some of these reports are verbal reports issued by

one of the G-l's special staffs to the Division Command Section to keep
it updated on certain critical items, e.g., the fatal result of a traffic
accident involving personnel from the division.

Buffering is handled by

the G-1 Office in these cases by using a system of priorities to handle
the material in a systematic way and prevent the Division Command Section
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from being overwhelmed with paper work.

Thus, the G-1 Office functions

as a buffering agent for its technical core.
The assignment of priorities to reports is in most cases an in
formal process which is carried on try a few select members of the office.
The criteria used to establish this priority system are:

the importance

of the report, the rank of the person submitting the report, the date that
the report is due to a higher authority for action, and the personal feel
ings of the person making the priority judgment toward the originating
person(s) or unit(s).

The G-1 Officers most responsible for judgments

on priorities are the Major (Assistant G-1) and the G-1.

Under this

system some items, those judged not to be of great importance, are allowed
either to die a slow death by inaction, or are acted upon when nothing
else is pressing.

Highly important items are expedited; normal priorities

are acted upon as soon as possible.
The advantage of such a system is that it allows the G-1 Office
to control the inputs into the core.

Because this priority system re

duces inefficiency and confusion within the core, it also keeps outside
authorities, such as higher headquarters, from meddling in the core ty
showing them efficiency and purpose.

Thus, it also defends the core.

It also acts as a screen that shuts off items that are unimportant to
the core Command Section and prevents its becoming inundated by small
details.

A danger of this system is that the G-1 Office may abuse its

position by filtering out bad reports and submitting only good reports to
the Command Section. Thus, it can make itself or its special staffs look
good in the eyes of the Commander, when such a state of affairs is any
thing but the truth.

Also, a G-1 Officer may stop a report that looks
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insignificant only to learn with the passing of time that it was judged
significant by the higher command.

Another problem is encountered if the

person submitting the report doesn't agree with G-1 priorities.

Usually,

such disagreements are handled in one of two ways. If the person sub
mitting the report outranks the G-1, the problem is forwarded to the Chiefof-Staff for a solution,

A person of the same or lesser rank than the G-1

would have to negotiate with the G-1.

If he is under the G-l's control,

he would have to accept the G-l*s decision as a final answer. If he does
not subnit to the G-l*s decision, he can be removed from his position, or
he can take the drastic step of skipping the G-1 in the chain of command
and request a decision from the Chief-of-Staff, Such actions are taboo to
everyone in the Arnor and, therefore, usually result in additional problems
for the individual.
The G-1 Office also buffers the core by inspecting core elements
to make sure that they are following all personnel-related policies set
by Corps and higher headquarters.

It is thus ensuring preventive main

tenance upon the core elements to prevent their being found deficient ty
the environment.

The G-1 Office can also abuse its power ty arbitrarily

requiring certain items or procedures of the core elements during inspec
tion without the approval of the Command Section,

Thus, it is able to

increase its own power at the expense of the core.
)

Vftiile the G-1 Office can buffer the core by using the above means,
it has found it impossible to buffer the flow of replacements into the
division.

Decisions upon the flow of personnel into a certain division

are set at Army levels and as such are completely out of the range of the
G-l's control.

Because the G-1, as an input component, cannot control
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this important environmental input, the division's core can have problems,
at times, providing defense or aid.
portance of input components

This situation underlines the im

buffering the technical core from environ

mental influences.
In understanding Thompson's second proposition, one must realize
that while buffering may prevent some environmental fluctuations from
overcoming an organization, it may at the same time present problems as
has been shown in the case of the G-1 Office.

Buffering was unjustifiably

used there to cut off a flow of negative information to higher authorities
and to increase the pov/er and position of the Office.

The buffering tech

nique of preventive maintenance used by the Field Staff, if misused or
overused, could alienate farmers rather than encourage them to continue
their membership in the UFO.
Another way that buffering may cause problems to the organization
is in the use of methods of buffering which have become obsolete or in
adequate due to the passing of time or changes in the organization.

The

inputs and outputs of an organization may change drastically, requiring
a new means of buffering them. The stage of development and the objec
tives of an organizational component also seem to have a regulatory ef
fect upon the use of buffering.

The G-1 Office can already make extensive

use of buffering to deal with its enviroimient and increase its power
while the Field Staff is still somewhat limited in this respect.

The G-l

Office is well-developed and has the formal objective of helping the core
along with the veiled objective of helping itself.

On the other hand, the

Field Staff is young and primarily interested in facilitating the func
tioning of the organization's core.

Therefore, it has little interest in

the use of buffering to extend its own power.

It can also be suggested that the state of the environment itself
sometimes has an important influence on both the degree of use of buffer
ing and the methods used by an organization.

In a combat situation, the

G-1 Office would certainly be faced with problems similar to those of the
Field Staff. Efforts to buffer the core in this more fluid environment
would force it to spend more time buffering to protect the core and less
time to enhance its own position. !Ehe greatly increased volume of work
that would be handled by the G-1 Office would allow it no time for selfinterested buffering until it had perfected its technology to deal with
the new environment.

Another illustration of the effect a changing en-

viroment has on buffering is that of the Field Staff. In its early
stages of development, Field Staff employees were hired and given no
training and very little supervision.

Thus, the organization's use of

buffering through an educational process was extremely limited, and the
employee was on his own within the environment.

As the Field Staff s

and the HFO's environment became increasingly complex, training and super
vision were added to buffer the organization against the environment by
increasing its internal control and external defense.

Leveling
The two previously mentioned methods of organizational defense
and control (sealing off and buffering) have been primarily centered upon
internal organizational actions to deal with the environment.

Now it is

time to explore another defense and control method in which the organiza
tion actually reaches into the environment to reduce the fluctuations
which affect its input and output transactions.

This method, called
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leveling, results in a smoothing out of input and output transactions in
which the organization induces the environment to react in a "beneficial,
predictable manner.

It defends against environmental fluctuations by re

tarding their development, and it thereby controls the flow of inputs
and outputs to and from the core.

An example of leveling is a manufac

turing company's offering a cash inducement to its customers to buy its
products during a period of low seasonal demand.

While there is no as

surance that the environment will react in a manner which is beneficial
to the organization, leveling is an effort by the organization to progress
within the environmental context.

As Thompson maintained in his third

proposition, "Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to smooth
out input and output transactions."

13

The KFO is currently moxinting a nationwide recruiting campaign
by the Field Staff, with the help of grass-roots membership, to induce
non-member farmers to join the organization.

Using member farmers to

help the Field Staff usually results in more successful recruiting drives.
The result of this campaign could be the establishment of the maximum
number of members that the organization could expect to recruit at a
certain point in time. In other words, the MPO's membership will be
stabilized at the point when enough farm commodities are flowing through
the MFC to ensure that the food processors will recognize its power and
offer a fair price for commodities, without overwhelming the Commodity
Department.

Two more factors establishing this optimum number of members

are the minimum necessary to provide financial support for the NPO, and

1 Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 21.

61
an upper limit placed so that the Field Staff will have time to recruit
new members to replace those lost through attrition as well as to main
tain the current members.

If the replacement of lost members biy new ones

is not adequate, the NFO may offer a special inducement to potential mem
bers so that its optimm level can be maintained.

This special induce

ment would be a leveling effort on the part of the organization.
In areas which once had a large active membership, but have be
come inactive, the MFO makes a different type of leveling effort.

The

Field Staff sends a large force of employees to entice ex-members back
into the organization by means of an intense person-to-person communica
tion of the NFO's successes and the values of rejoining. One inducement
to rejoin the organization is often simply to get all of these Field Staff
enqjloyees off his back.

Once the ex-member is back in the fold, inputs

will presumably restune flowing into the core.

Such leveling methods are

not very successful, because ma^y ex-members become more resentful with
each visit until they refuse even to consider rejoining the NPO,
The Field Staff, not the entire NFO, is the organizational ele
ment in these leveling actions which actively seeks to smooth out input
transactions. Therefore, it may be possible to enlarge upon Thon5)son's
third proposition in that he maintains that organizations seek to smooth
out input transactions, but this examination revealed that a support ele
ment, the Field Staff, did the actual smoothing out of the NFO's input
transactions.

The NFO*s hierarchy, a colre element, ordered the Field

Staff to try to smooth out the flow of inputs. Thus, the organization's
core elements may order their support elements to smooth out the flow
of inputs or outputs; the support elements do the acttial work.

On the
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basis of this information, Thompson's third proposition would be restated,
"Under norms of rationality, organizational input and output components,
upon orders of the core, seek to smooth.out input and output transactions."
The G-1 Office smooths out the inputs to the division command ele
ment by setting required dates for delivery of reports from lower units in
order to make certain that sufficient time is allowed for evaluation by the
G-1 Office before the reports are forwarded to higher headquarters.

A

major report would usually require at least two days of evaluation and
correction before being forwarded to higher headquarters, III Corps. The
exact date on which a report is to be delivered to the G-1 Office is set
by the G-1 after conferring with the Chief-of-Staff.

The advantage of

this arrangement is that the office of the Chief-of-Staff, a core element,
provides additional leverage to ensure that tinits comply with the due
date.

No unit commander wishes to be reprimanded by the Division Command

Section for delinquent reports.

Once again the proximity of the G-1 Of

fice to the center of power can allow it to exercise the power of a line
position; it can actually issue orders to core units.
The G-1 Office also tries to protect the core from the inconven
iences they might encounter consequent to the smoothing out procedures
initiated by a higher organization's input component, such as G-1 of III
Corps.

Foremost of these problems is meeting the dates that reports are

required to be submitted to higher headquarters.

The G-1 Office protects

the core in these instances by requesting the Corps to allow more time,
or by ignoring hi^er headquarters' request for a report until the last
possible moment, or by engaging in informal arguments between subordinate
officers of the higher III Corps and the lower division G-1 Offices.

VJhile arguing in itself solves nothing, it does stall for time.

The

danger in this course of action is the possibility of the argument::
reaching the superiors of the two officers which allows a minor argument
to become a major conflict in which the losing office would usually be
the lower division G—1 Office. Prom this case, it can be observed that
input components often come into conflict when they try to smooth out the
various transactions between them.
One input to the Division's Core which the G-1 Office cannot
smooth out is the inflow of replacements, which is its most important
input into the division.

This input is out of the range of the G-1's

control and as such is a critical variable in the core's ability to oper
ate.
The G-1 Office and the Field Staff both have the same functions
because they act as input components attempting to smooth out input trans
actions.

Thus, they provide empirical support for Thompson's third proi)-

osition.

The UPO and the Army Division look upon the Field Staff and the

G-1 Office, respectively, as instnaments by which they attempt to influence
the environment by their efforts to smooth out inputs.

Because the G-1

Office has command-related control over that part of the environment with
in the division, it can be reasonably sure that it can smooth out these
inputs into the core command section by setting due dates upon reports.
Therefore, the more influence the component has over its environment the
more likely it is to succeed in smoothing out transactions.

However, the

G-1 Office's and the Field Staff's attempts to smooth out input transac
tions over which they have little influence or control has no guarantee of
success.

The environment may not wish to cooperate with the organization's
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components.

Without some degree of cooperation from the environment, all

attempts to smooth out input or output transactions will fail.

Anticipation and Adaptation
If an organization cannot seal off its core technology, buffer
its core from the environment, or change or smooth out environmental fluc
tuations, it must then seek other methods of control and defense against
the environment.

One method, which is primarily defensive, is to try to

look into the future and predict environmental fluctuations or changes.
An organization's core may be performing a function that the environment
no longer needs.

The U.S. Government may pass a bill authorizing the

creation of a government agency which will perform the functions of the
NFO. If the KFO has not anticipated such a government move, it will be
caught by surprise and will probably be destroyed.

Needless to say,

anticipating changes within the environment which may range from completely
irrational to mostly rational is a very difficult task. However, if an
organization can anticipate environmental change, it can initiate search
for a way of adapting in order to stirvive.

The NFO might have foreseen the

above change in government policy and changed objectives from collective
bargaining to politics, which would mean an attempt to influence the func
tioning of the new government bargaining agency through political acts such
as lobbying.

While anticipation is a prime defensive mechanism of an organ

ization, adaptation also permits an organization to defend itself by chang
ing its objectives and/or techniques. It is in the light of the above dis
cussion that Thompson's fourth proposition can be examined. "Under hbrms
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of rationality, organizations seek to anticipate and adapt to environ
mental changes which cannot be buffered or leveled,
Because the Field Staff penetrates the environment for the core
(Commodity Department) of the NFO, it is relied upon as a source of in
formation that can be used to anticipate future environmental changes. It
may be discovered by the Field Staff, for instance, that large blocks of
members are disgruntled because they have not seen any action on the part
of the Commodity Department to raise the price of their commodities.

The

Field Staff can pass the names and location of these members on to the
Commodity Department with the hope that they will be contacted by the core
and told of contract agreements within their areas. If no action is taken
ly the Commodity Department, the Field Staff can predict that these mem
bers will drop out of the organization.

Both the Field Staff and the Com

modity Department have the information necessary to adapt to the loss of
these members* financial support and commodities. The problems of this
information-sharing procedure is that often there is a breakdown of com
munication between the support and core elements of the NFO,

Either the

Commodity Department doesn't get the correct information from the Field
Staff as to the nrimber of dissatisfied farmers, or the message is not com
municated with the sense of urgency necessary to promote action.

This

problem is largely the result of human inattentiveness.
While the Field Staff does pass on information concerning member
ship to the dore, which is its primary responsibility, it does not pro
vide very much information regarding commodity market trends.

No de

tailed market analysis is provided by the Field Staff or ai^y other support

I'^'Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 21,
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element.

The Commodity Department will probably find it advantageous to

establish support elements whose specific function will be to provide it
with detailed market analyses.

There are already individuals within the

Commodity Department who are increasingly taking over this role.
The Field Staff also compiles information that is necessary to
its support role within the NFO,

Detailed maps are kept which allow the

success or failure of membership drives.

Computerized membership rosters

are maintained to facilitate dues collection. Daily communication between
Field Staff employees and their supervisors is official policy.

With

such information, the supervisor can anticipate future trouble spots and
can suggest methods to deal with them.

A supervisor may learn from one

of his field employees that an area already organized under the !JFO con
tains large numbers of non-member farmers who are willing to enter the
NFO. He can, then, switch other employees into this area and quickly pro
vide more inputs to the core,
A point that must be stressed from the Field Staff's example is
that without an adequate flow of information into the organization there
cannot be anticipation of environmental change.

Needless to say, without

anticipation there cannot be adaptation. Because anticipation is so im
portant, specialized support elements are often given the function of
information analysis in order to anticipate future trends.
While the G-1 Office cannot buffer or smooth out the inflow of
replacements, it can try to anticipate futtire manpower levels.
is trying to forecast future environmental changes.

Thus, it

Forecasting of future

personnel input flow is accon^jlished by the G-1 Office and the Adjutant
General requesting from tiigher headquarters a detailed summary of officer.

warrant officer, and enlisted replacements that the division can expect
over a given period of time.

Also, individual orders from Army level

iirhich assign replacements to the division are carefully screened "by these
two offices to deteraiine rank, skills, and date of arrival.

With such

information, the G-1 Office and Adjutant General Office forecasts are
nearly correct; the division's core vjill know and can adapt to shortages
or excesses of personnel.

!Hie core can also judge from this information

its ability to produce defense or aid.

If core units are understrength,

they will not be able to fujiction properly in their assigned roles.
Because anticipation of future manpower levels is so important to
the core, the G-1 Office and Adjutant General spend a great deal of time
and manpower in order to forecast future manpower levels accurately.

The

environment, however, is often in such a state of fluctuation because of
political or social changes that all efforts to anticipate and adapt to
manpower changes are frustrated.

The division may be brought up to full

strength more rapidly than usual to meet a woria crisis, thus straining
the abilities of the G-1 and Adjutant General's offices to anticipate and
adapt to the new situation in a logical and systematic way. The divi
sion's core will also have difficulty reactixig to the new inputs, which
may temporarily decrease its efficiency.
^A fundamental distinction between the Field Staff and the G-1
Office is that the Field Staff is primarily interested in anticipating
and adapting itself to change and has a secondary interest in providing
the KFO's core with information necessary to this anticipation and adapta
tion.

The G-1 Office, on the other hand, has the primary function of

providing information upon futxxre environmental changes to the core.

68

There are fevr, if any, reasons for it to anticipate and adapt itself to
environmental change because its own environment is stable enough for it
to learn what adaptive changes are necessary. The G-1 Office knows what
to do with new conditions; it doesn't have to anticipate them. If, how
ever, the division is moved into a combat situation, the chances are that
the environment will change enough so that the G-1 Office must anticipate
and adapt for its own survival.

Therefore, the condition of the environ

ment is an important determinant of the degree to which an organization
or its parts try to anticipate and adapt to environmental change. It is
also important to note that organizations use their support or peripheral
elements as information gatherers to gather the knowledge necessary to
anticipate environmental changes and adapt the core and support elements
to them. To summarize this discussion:

Thompson's fourth proposition

is valid, but the important questions of exactly how an organization anti
cipates and adapts to environmental changes and to what extent this anti
cipation and adaptation are necessary must be answered separately for
each organization.

Rationing
It is not always possible to use the preceding methods to control
the organization so as to protect it from the fluctuations, changes, and
power of the environment.

The Field Staff may not be able to collect dues

or recruit new members because of adverse conditions such as poor crops,
discouraging economic circumstances (inflation or recession), rural pov
erty, detrimental press, or Tinsettling political remarks. In all of these
cases, the inputs upon which the NFO is dependent

can

be seriously
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disrupted.

As has been stated before, the flow of military replacements

into the division may not be adequate because of Annjr commitments to other
zones of operation or because of political factors.

No amount of pressure

upon higher authorities can or will increase the flow of personnel avail
able to the G-1 Office.

Therefore, the division's core is faced with the

prospect of becoming understrength and unable to function. In both in
stances, the support cou^jonents of these organizations, the Field Staff
and the G-1 Office, are unable to change conditions that are threatening
them as well as their cores.
The administrator and commander of these two organizations cannot
ignore these disruptions of their organizations* functions.

Therefore,

the President of the NFO and the Commander of the Division will have to
initiate some method or action to insure the survival of the entire or
ganization.

This method of dealing with such situations is best described

by Tho?^son*s fifth proposition. "When btiffering, leveling, and forecast
ing do not protect their technical cores from environmental fluctuations,
organizations under norms of rationality resort to

rationing,"^5

Ration

ing is an action used try an organization in which it apportions a smaller
than usual amount of supplies under a priority system to maintain the
survival of its core.
The method of rationing practiced by the G-1 Office is to assign
what replacements the division does receive from the Ariqy to priority
units, e,g., the maintenance battalion, in order to keep the core's equip
ment functioning.

The divisional commander tells the G-1 Office which

^•5ThoD5)son, Organizations in Action, p. 23.
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units have priority vjithin the division.

Units which do not receive

priority designations are usually administrative support elements, hecause the commander feels the core can somehow function without them.
Financial difficulty in the HPO that is brought on hy inadequate
member support is handled by simply not issuing paychecks to employees
until the organization becomes financially solvent.

The decision to under

take such a drastic measure is made by the higher authorities of the UFO,
usually the President.

Because both the core and support elements are

equally important to the HPO's survival presently, the entire organiza
tion undergoes financial rationing.

Despite this organization-xiride ra

tioning, there are probably certain key individuals who continue to
receive funds.

Most employees seem to accept this arrangement until they,

too, become financially insolvent, at which point many quit. Despite
financial distress, the sense of performing a vital mission for American
agriculture keeps most employees working long after employees of other
organizations would resign.
Five important aspects of rationing are apparent in both organ
izations.

First, the leader of the entire organization imposes rationing

upon some or all of the core and support elements.

Elements x-jhich are

most restricted are those judged to be least necessary to the survival of
the organization.

They are usually support elements, but can also include

core elements; for instance, one or two maneuver battalions may be insuf
ficiently manned to keep the others up to strength. Second, rationing
is an extreme means of controlling the organization.

In effect the or

ganization's leadership is trying to prevent energy from leaving the or
ganization unnecessarily, but to limit necessary supplies means that the
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organization cannot ftinction up to its capacity. Third, rationing can
work hest in an organization such as the HPO where employees feel they
are accomplishing something constructive in spite of inadequate supplies.
Fourth, rationing is only a temporary solution to an organization's prob
lems.

An employee of the Field Staff working for an extended period of

time without a paycheck and having a family to support cannot give his
full attention to finding ways to recruit additional members or collect
dues. He will soon "be xirorrying more about his own survival than that of
the organization.

A division that cannot provide defense or aid to its

society because of extensive personnel shortages is useless to the Army.
Thus, it would either have to be disbanded or brought up to strength. If
the cores of these tv/o organizations do not fimction at their maximum
over a period of time, by producing hi^er farm prices or by providing
defense and aid, their environments will have no need for them and they
v/ill cease to exist. Fifth, rationing is to be umdertaken only after all
other methods—^buffering, leveling, and forecasting—^have failed to con
trol and defend the organization from the environment.

Buffering, for

example, is a logical method of the organization to deal with its environ
ment.

Rationing, on the other hand, is a last-ditch effort applied v/ith-

out much logic simply to save the organization.

Using such drastic steps

is very costly in economic, political, and social terms.

Cutting off

employees* paychecks or leaving units unable to function brings into
question the ability of these organizations to function within their
environments.
The above five points seem to substantiate Thompson's fifth prop
osition.

Rationing is a last effort when all else has failed to ensure

the survival of the organization vjithin the environment.
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There are tvfo ways that these organizations can try to overcome
the environmental fluctuations v/hich necessitated rationing. They may
simply wait until time rectifies the environmental irritants, e.g., the
end of a recession for the HPO, or a change of Army priorities which will
give the division adequate personnel.

If time will not rectify the situa

tion, these organizations must reprogram their cores to supply items
needed "by the changed environment.

The KPO can once again become a small

organization serving only those areas which will support it; the division,
with Army approval, may iDecome a smaller task force which can perform
with feHer personnel. An organization must restructure itself to operate
effectively and efficiently within its environment.

PMT THEEE

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Validity and Utility
This study has established support for the validity of five of
Thompson's propositions (as outlined in Organizations in Action) when ap
plied to the two widely differing organizations discussed here.

As has

been shown, they can be enlarged upon and restated, but it is impossible
to find fault with Thompson's basic premises.

It is conceivable that the

remainder of Thompson's propositions are equally valid, though it has not
been possible to discuss them in this paper.
The utility of these propositions is established ty the fact that,
once understood, they can be combined with empirical knowledge to analyze
why, when and how an organization reacts to its environment.

Their ul

timate value lies in their ability to make thesscience of organizational
management easier to \inderstand and to use,

A part of this science in

cludes the foretelling of the need for future actions on the part of
various organizations.

For example,

if the NFO accomplishes its goal of

raising farm prices, it must recognize that some other segment of society
will have lost a proportionate amount of revenue.
resultant hostility and adapt itself

It must anticipate the

the means advanced l^y Thompson,

e.g., strengthening its sealing off procedvires to prevent the hostile
elements from interfering in the fiinctioning of its core and support
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technologies, and establishing an agency among its support elements which
would buffer the entire organization by maintaining a positive public re
lations program.

For example, this would include explaining how the rise

in prices benefits farmers and society as a whole.

Point of Departure
Thoit^json describes two very different types of mechanisms in the
five propositions discussed in this paper.

Sealing off and rationing are

both extreme, almost instinctive mechanisms to restrict negative entropy;
buffering, leveling, and anticipation and adaptation are methods used
when an organization is faii-ly sure of its stability.

These two cate

gories are differentiated by the certainty or uncertainty with which the
organization views its environment in specific instances.

Since the G-1

Office is fairly sure of its existence, it can utilize buffering, level
ing, and anticipation and adaptation to a much greater degree than can
the NFO.

There are circumstances, however, when it has little control,

such as in its allotment of replacements, and must, therefore, use sealing
off and rationing.

No organization has enough power to control its en

vironment completely and totally eliminate uncertainty.
It was noted in this analysis of Thompson's propositions that the
support elements of both organizations utilized the mechanisms described
in acting for or upon the core elements. Therefore, the support elements
act to shield the core from the environment and thus reduce uncertainty.
We have probably followed the line of thought envisioned by Thompson when
he stated, "As a point of departure, we suggest that organizations cope
with uncertainty by creating certain parts specifically to deal with it.
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specializing other parts in operating under conditions of certainty or
near certainty,As envisioned by this author, the support elements
deal with the uncertainties of the environment so that thelcore elements
can work in relative certainty.

The importance of the support element

is emphasized by the negative exan^le of the two organizations.

Neither

has an output support element since there are almost no ways of rationing,
leveling, buffering, or anticipating contracted farm prices or the need
for defense or aid.

Therefore, their cores still face the uncertainty

of not knowing whether they can deliver the products needed or if they
can achieve their goals or even survive.

Criticism
Thonqjson does not seem to give a clear definition of an organi
zation to facilitate the reader's understanding of the complex termino
logy he uses. For example, he does not define the boundaries of the core
of an organization as differentiated from other organizational elements.
It is possible he is leaving more precise definitions up to his readers,
and it is hoped that this paper has been useful in this successive approxi
mation process.

l^Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 13.
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